Abstract. Camellia is one of the widely used block ciphers, which has been selected as an international standard by ISO/IEC. In this paper, by exploiting some interesting properties of the key-dependent layer, we improve previous results on impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round Camellia and gain some new observations. First, we introduce some new 7-round impossible differentials of Camellia for weak keys. These weak keys that work for the impossible differential take 3/4 of the whole key space, therefore, we further get rid of the weak-key assumption and leverage the attacks on reduced-round Camellia to all keys by utilizing the multiplied method. Second, we build a set of differentials which contains at least one 8-round impossible differential of Camellia with two F L/F L −1 layers. Following this new result, we show that the key-dependent transformations inserted in Camellia cannot resist impossible differential cryptanalysis effectively. Based on this set of differentials, we present a new cryptanalytic strategy to mount impossible differential attacks on reduced-round Camellia.
Introduction
The block cipher Camellia was jointly proposed by NTT and Mitsubishi in 2000 [1] . It was selected as one of the CRYPTREC e-government recommended ciphers ⋆ Corresponding author.
in 2002 [4] and as a member of the NESSIE block cipher portfolio in 2003 [20] . In 2005, it was adopted as the international standard by ISO/IEC [6] . Camellia is a 128-bit block cipher. It supports variable key sizes and the number of the rounds depends on the key size, i.e., 18 rounds for a 128-bit key size and 24 rounds for 192/256-bit key sizes. For simplicity, they can be usually denoted as Camellia-128, Camellia-192 and Camellia-256, respectively. Camellia adopts the basic Feistel structure with some key-dependent functions F L/F L −1 inserted every six rounds, where these key-dependent transformations must be linear and reversible for any fixed key. The goals for such a design are to provide non-regularity across rounds and to thwart future unknown attacks.
Up to now, many cryptanalytic methods were used to evaluate the security of reduced-round Camellia such as linear cryptanalysis, differential cryptanalysis, higher order differential attack, truncated differential attack, collision attack, square attack and impossible differential attack. Before 2011, most attacks focused on the security of simplified versions of Camellia, which did not take the F L/F L −1 and whitening layers into account [9-11, 16, 19, 21-24] . Recently, some attacks involved in the study of the original structure of Camellia. For instance, Chen et al. constructed a 6-round impossible differential with the F L/F L −1 layer to attack 10-round Camellia-192 and 11-round Camellia-256 [3] , Lu, Liu and Li independently improved Chen's results to attack on reduced-round Camellia [12, 14, 17] , Lu et al. proposed higher order meet-in-the-middle attacks on 10-round Camellia-128, 11-round Camellia-192 and 12-round Camellia-256 [18] .
Impossible differential cryptanalysis was independently proposed by Knudsen [7] and Biham [2] . Its main idea is to use impossible differentials that hold with probability zero to discard the wrong keys until only one key is left. So far, impossible differential cryptanalysis has received much attention and been used to attack a variety of well-known block ciphers such as AES, ARIA, CLEFIA, MISTY1 and so on.
In this paper, we reevaluate the security of reduced-round Camellia with F L/F L −1 and whitening layers against impossible differential cryptanalysis from two aspects. On the one hand, we construct some new 7-round impossible differentials of Camellia for weak keys, which work for 75% of the keys. Based on one of them, we mount impossible differential attacks on reduced-round Camellia in the weak-key setting. Then we further propose a multiplied method to extend our attacks for the whole key space. The basic idea is that if the correct key belongs to the set of weak keys, then it will never satisfy the impossible differential. While if the correct key is not a weak key, we get 2-bit conditions about the key. In fact, for the whole key space, we attack 10- 123 chosen plaintexts and 2 251.1 13-round encryptions (not from the first round but with the whitening layers), respectively. All attacks adopt the early abort technique [15] . In table 1, we summarize our results along with the former known ones on reduced-round Camellia. 
Preliminaries
2.1 Some Notations -P, C: the plaintext and the ciphertext; -L i−1 , R i−1 : the left half and the right half of the i-th round input; -∆L i−1 , ∆R i−1 : the left half and the right half of the input difference in the i-th round; -X | Y : the concatenation of X and Y ; -kw 1 |kw 2 , kw 3 |kw 4 : the pre-whitening key and the post-whitening key; -k i : the subkey used in the i-th round; -kl i (1 ≤ i ≤ 6): 64-bit keys used in the functions F L/F L −1 ; -S r , ∆S r : the output and the output difference of the S-boxes in the r-th round;
: the left half and the right half of a n-bit word X; -X i , X {i,j} , X {i∼j} : the i-th byte, the i-th and j-th bytes and the i-th to the j-th bytes of X;
: the i-th bit, the i-th and j-th bits and the i-th to j-th bits of X; -⊕, ∩, ∪: bitwise exclusive-OR (XOR), AND, and OR operations, respectively; -0 (i) , 1 (i) : consecutive i bits are zero or one.
Overview of Camellia
Camellia [1] is a 128-bit block cipher. It adopts the basic Feistel structure with keyed functions F L/F L −1 inserted every 6 rounds. Camellia uses variable key sizes and the number of rounds depends on the key size, i.e., 18 rounds for a 128-bit key size and 24 rounds for 192/256-bit key sizes. Its round function uses a SPN structure, including the XOR operation with the round subkey, the nonlinear transformation S and the linear permutation P . Please refer to [1] for detailed information.
The key schedule algorithm of Camellia applies a 6-round Feistel structure to derive two 128-bit intermediate variables K A and K B from K L and K R , and then all round subkeys can be generated by K L , K R , K A and K B . For Camellia-128, the 128-bit key K is used as K L and K R is 0. For Camellia-192, the left 128-bit of the key K is used as K L , and the concatenation of the right 64-bit of the key K and the complement of the right 64-bit of the key K is used as K R . For Camellia-256, the main key K is separated into two 128-bit variables K L and K R , i.e., K = K L | K R .
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In this section, we construct some 7-round impossible differentials of Camellia in weak-key setting. Based on one of them, we present impossible differential attacks on 10-round Camellia-128, 11-round Camellia-192 and 12-round Camellia-256 which start from the first round. In addition, we also extend these attacks to 12-round Camellia-192 and 14-round Camellia-256 with two F L/F L −1 layers.
7-Round Impossible Differentials of Camellia for Weak Keys
This section introduces 7-round impossible differentials of Camellia in weak-key setting, which is based on the following lemmas and propositions.
Lemma 1 ([8])
. Let X, X ′ , K be l-bit values, and ∆X = X ⊕ X ′ , then the differential properties of AND and OR operations are:
Lemma 2 ([3]
). Let ∆X and ∆Y be the input and output differences of F L. 
L is 0 or KL (8) R is 1, then the first byte of input difference ∆Y should be zero, where e is a non-zero byte. We also obtain three other impossible differentials under different weak-key assumptions:
-(0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0, 0|a|0|0|0|c|0|0) (0|0|0|0|0|d|0|0, 0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0) with conditions KL We denote this type of impossible differentials above as 5+2 WKID (weak-key impossible differentials). Due to the feature of Feistel structure, we also deduce another type of 7-round impossible differentials with the F L/F L −1 layer inserted between the second and the third rounds. We call them 2+5 WKID, which are depicted as follows.
-(0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0, 0|0|0|0|d|0|0|0) (a|0|0|0|c|0|0|0, 0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0) with conditions KL 
Impossible Differential Attack on 10-Round Camellia-128
We first propose an attack that works for 3 × 2 126 (= Data Collection.
1. Choose 2 n structures of plaintexts, and each structure contains 2 32 plaintexts (L 0 , R 0 ) = (α 1 |x 1 |x 2 |x 3 |α 2 |x 4 |x 5 |x 6 , P (β 1 |y 1 |y 2 |y 3 |β 2 |y 4 |y 5 |y 6 )), where x i and y i (i = 1, ..., 6) are fixed values in each structure, while α j and β j (j = 1, 2) take all the possible values. 2. For each structure, ask for the encryption of the plaintexts and get 2 32 ciphertexts. Store them in a hash table H indexed by C R,{1,5} , the XOR of C R,2 and C R,3 , the XOR of C R,2 and C R,4 , the XOR of C R,2 and C R,6 , the XOR of C R,2 and C R,7 , the XOR of C R,2 and C R, 8 . Then by birthday paradox, we get 2 n+7 pairs of ciphertexts with the differences (∆C L , ∆C R ) = (g 1 |g 2 |g 3 |g 4 |g 5 |g 6 |g 7 |g 8 , 0|f |f |f |0|f |f |f ), and the differences of corresponding plaintext pairs satisfy (∆L 0 , ∆R 0 ) = (a|0|0|0|c|0|0|0, P (b 1 |0|0|0|b 2 |0|0|0)), where a, c, f and b i (i = 1, 2) are non-zero bytes, and g i are unknown bytes. For every pair, compute
Keep only the pairs whose ciphertexts satisfy g ′ 1 = 0. The probability of this event is 2 −8 , thus the expected number of remaining pairs is 2 n−1 .
Key Recovery.
1. For each pair obtained in the data collection phase, guess the 16-bit value As the probability of a pair being discarded is 0.5, the expected number of remaining pairs is 2 n−66 . 3. For every remaining pair, guess the 8-bit value K 9,5 , partially decrypt the output value (R 9,5 , R ) and the difference ∆S 9,5 . If there is a pair satisfying ∆S 9,5 = ∆C R,2 , we discard the guessed key and try another one. Otherwise we exhaustively search for the remaining 48 bits of the key under this guessed key, if the correct key is obtained, we halt the attack; otherwise, another key guess should be tried.
Complexity. Since the probability of the event ∆S 9,5 = ∆C R,2 in step 3 of key recovery phase is 2 −8 , the expected number of remaining guesses for 72-bit target subkeys is about ǫ = 2
If we choose ǫ = 1, then n is 79.8, and the proposed attack requires 2 n+32 = 2 111.8 chosen plaintexts. The time and memory complexities are dominated by step 2 of data collection phase, which are about 2 111.8 10-round encryptions and 2 n−1 × 4 × 2 4 = 2 84.8 bytes.
Extending the Attack to the Whole Key Space. On the basis of the above impossible differential attack for weak keys, we construct a multiplied attack on 10-Round Camellia-128.
-Phase 1. Perform an impossible differential attack by using the 5+2 WKID (0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0, a|0|0|0|c|0|0|0) (0|0|0|0|d|0|0|0, 0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0). This phase is extremely similar to the weak-key attack that is described above. However, it is slightly different when the attack is finished. That is, if there is a key kept, then the key is the correct key, and we halt the procedure of the attack. Otherwise, we conclude that the correct key does not belong to this set of weak keys, which means that kl The upper bound of the time complexity is 2 111.8 × 4 + 2 120 ≈ 2 120 . The data complexity is about 2 113.8 . The memory could be reused in different phase, so the memory requirement is about 2 84.8 bytes.
Attack on 11-Round Camellia-192
We add one round on the bottom of 10-round attack and give an attack on 11-round Camellia-192.
Data Collection. Choose 2 80.64 structures of plaintexts. Each structure contains 2 32 plaintexts satisfying (L 0 , R 0 ) = (α 1 |x 1 |x 2 |x 3 |α 2 |x 4 |x 5 |x 6 , P (β 1 |y 1 |y 2 |y 3 | β 2 |y 4 |y 5 |y 6 )), where x i and y i (i = 1, ..., 6) are fixed values in each structure, while α j and β j (j = 1, 2) take all the possible values. Ask for the encryption of the corresponding ciphertext for each plaintext, compute P −1 (C R ) and store the plaintext-ciphertext pairs (L 0 , R 0 , C L , C R ) in a hash table indexed by 8-bit value (P −1 (C R )) 1 . By birthday paradox, we get 2 135.64 pairs whose ciphertext differences satisfy 
The Attack on 12-Round Camellia-256
We add one round on the bottom of 11-round attack, and present a 12-round attack on Camellia-256. The attack procedure is similar to the 11-round attack. We also construct another type of impossible differential attack of Camellia-256, which adds four rounds on the top and one round on the bottom of the 2+5 WKID (see section 3.1). The attack is performed under the chosen ciphertext attack scenario. Similar to the attack based on the 5+2 WKID, the data and time complexity are about 2 113.17 and 2 216.3 , respectively.
Extending the Attack to the Whole Key Space. On the basis of two types of impossible differential attacks for weak keys, we mount a multiplied attack on 12-round Camellia-256 for the whole key space as below.
-Phases 1 to 8. Preform impossible differential attacks by using of all conditional impossible differentials 2+5 WKID list in section 3. 
8-Round Impossible Differentials of Camellia and Their Applications 2
In this section, we first present a method to construct a set of differentials, which contains at least one 8-round impossible differential of Camellia with two F L/F L −1 layers for any fixed key. Based on this set of differentials, we propose a new strategy to attack on reduced-round Camellia-128/192/256 with the whitening and F L/F L −1 layers.
The Construction of 8-Round Impossible Differentials of Camellia
We first illustrate some properties of F L/F L −1 .
then the output difference of F L is (a|0|0|0|0|0|0|0).
By Propositions 4, we construct an 8-round impossible differential of Camellia with two F L/F L −1 layers for any fixed subkey. Proposition 5. For an 8-round Camellia encryption with two F L/F L −1 layers inserted after the first and seventh rounds, the input difference of the first round is (0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0, a|0|0|0|a ′ |0|0|0) and the output difference of the eighth round is (b|0|0|0|b ′ |0|0|0, 0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0) with a and b being nonzero bytes and a
layers. If a ′ and b ′ satisfy the following equations: are from 0 (14) to 1 (14) . Denote their corresponding impossible differentials by ∆ i for 0 ≤ i ≤ 2 14 − 1. Let A be a set including all differentials The Attack Strategy. Select a differential ∆ i from A. Based on it, we mount an impossible differential attack on reduced-round Camellia given enough plaintext pairs.
1. If one subkey will be kept, we recover the secret key by the key schedule and verify whether it is correct by some plaintext-ciphertext pairs. If success, halt this attack. Otherwise, try another differential ∆ j (j = i) of A and perform a new impossible differential attack. 2. If no subkeys or more than one subkeys are left, select another differential of A to execute a new impossible differential attack.
Our attack strategy can really recover the correct key. As a matter of fact, if ∆ i is an impossible differential, we make sure the expected number of remaining wrong keys will be almost zero given enough chosen plaintexts. Therefore, we only consider those differentials which result in one subkey remaining. By Proposition 5, we know the set A contains at least one impossible differential. So we try each differential of A until the correct key is recovered. The worst scenario is that the correct key is retrieved from the last try.
Impossible Differential Attack on 13-round Camellia-256
Based on three scenarios of differentials in A, we present an impossible differential attack on 13-round Camellia-256 with the F L/F L −1 and whitening layers from rounds 4 to 16.
We use these equivalent subkeys k a , k b , k c , k d and k e instead of the round subkeys k 4 , k 5 , k 14 , k 15 and k 16 so as to remove the whitening layers. In the following, we will illustrate this attack.
, where a and b are nonzero bytes and a (1) = b (1) = 0 (See Fig. 4) . Data Collection. Select a structure of plaintexts, which contains 2 55 plaintexts with the following form:
(P (α 1 |x 1 |x 2 |x 3 |x 4 |x 5 |x 6 |x 7 ), P (α 2 |α 3 |α 4 |α 5 |α 6 |x 8 |x 9 |α 7 )),
where α
5 , x i (1 ≤ i ≤ 9) are fixed and
takes all possible values. Clearly, each structure forms 2 109 plaintext pairs, the differences of which have the form: (P (g 1 |0|0|0|0|0|0|0), P (g 2 |g 3 ⊕a|g 4 ⊕a|a|g 5 ⊕a|0|0|g 6 ⊕a)) with a and g i (1 ≤ i ≤ 6) being nonzero bytes and a (1) =0. We take all possible values of (α
5 , x 4 , x 8 , x 9 ) and 2 43 different values of x i (1 ≤ i ≤ 7, i = 4) to derive 2 68 special structures. In total, there are 2 123 chosen plaintexts which form 2 177 plaintext pairs. Encrypt these plaintext pairs to obtain the corresponding ciphertext pairs. If the right halves of their ciphertexts differences have the form:
(1) = 0, then these pairs will be kept. The expected number of remaining pairs is about 2 160 .
1. Guess k a,1 . For each remaining pair, check whether the equation ∆S 4,1 = (P −1 (∆P R )) 1 holds. If ∆S 4,1 = (P −1 (∆P R )) 1 for some pair, then this pair will be discarded. Next guess each possible value of k a,l for l = 2, 3, 5, 8. Keep only the pairs satisfying ∆S 4,l = ( 4 . The expected number of remaining pairs is about 2 120 . Finally, guess k a,{4,6,7} and compute the inputs of the fifth round for each remaining pair. 2. Guess k b,1 and test whether ∆S 5,1 is equal to (P −1 (∆P L )) 1 for each remaining pair. If ∆S 5,1 = (P −1 (∆P L )) 1 for one pair, then this pair will be removed. Finally, about 2 112 pairs will be kept.
3. Guess k c,l for 2 ≤ l ≤ 8. Verify whether ∆S 16,l is equal to (P −1 (∆C L )) l for every remaining pair. If ∆S 16,l = (P −1 (∆C L )) l for some pair, then this pair is discarded. The expected number of remaining pairs is about 2 56 . Next guess k c,1 and compute the outputs of the 15- 2, 3, 5, 8) hold. The probability that to happen is about 2 −40 . Thus about 2 16 pairs will be kept. Next guess other bytes of k d and calculate the outputs of the 14-th round. 5. Guess k e,1 and compute the output difference of the S-Boxes in the 14-th round. If ∆S 14,1 is equal to (P −1 (∆L 14 )) 1 , then we remove this value of k e,1 with (k a , k b,1 , k c , k d ) . The probability of this event is about 2 −8 . After trying all possible values of (k a , k b,1 , k c , k d , k e,1 ) , if only one joint subkey remains, then ∆ is likely to be an impossible differential. At this time, we recover the secret key by the key schedule and verify whether it is correct by some plaintext-ciphertext pairs. If no subkeys or more than one subkeys are left, then ∆ is possible to exist. At this time, try another differential of A. As a matter of fact, if ∆ is an impossible differential, the expected number of remaining wrong subkeys is about 2 4 . We consider that all wrong subkeys are removed and only the correct subkey is left. Therefore, we require to perform the following step only if one subkey will be kept. 6. According to the key schedule of Camellia-256, we can recover the secret key from this unique 208-bit subkey ( and b
, where a, b, a ′ and b ′ are nonzero bytes and 
Impossible Differential Attack on 12-round Camellia-192
In this section, we attack 12-round Camellia-192 from rounds 4 to 15 with the 8-round differentials inserted rounds 6 to 13. Some equivalent subkeys k a and k b are defined as before. In addition, let k pairs. After filtering some pairs by the ciphertext differences, about 2 154 pairs are expected to remain. The following steps can be preformed in the similar way.
We found that the time complexity of Case 3 is maximal. Therefore, the total time complexity is at most 2 14 × 2 173.2 ≈ 2 187.2 12-round encryptions. The data and memory complexities are 2 123 chosen plaintexts and 2 160 bytes, respectively.
Impossible Differential Attack on 11-round Camellia-128
For Camellia-128, we put two additional rounds on the top and one additional round on the bottom of 8-round differentials. Based on it, we attack 11-round Camellia-128 from rounds 4 to 14. Similarly, we divide all possible differentials into three different cases as before. For Case 1, we take 2 67 special structures (1) . Totally, the data complexity is 2 122 chosen plaintexts which form 2 176 pairs. Encrypt these pairs to acquire the corresponding ciphertext pairs. Then we discard some pairs whose ciphertext differences don't satisfy this form: (P (h|0|0|0|0|0|0|0), b|0|0|0|0|0|0|0) with b and h being non-zero bytes and b (1) = 0. The number of remaining pairs after this test is about 2 63 . Guess k e,1 , k a and k b,1 in turn and operate the similar steps. If only one subkey is left, we retrieve the secret key by the key schedule. Otherwise, try anther differential of A. As a matter of fact, if ∆ is an impossible differential, the expected number of remaining pairs is about 2 80 × (1 − 2 −8 ) 15 ≈ 2 −104.7 . For other two cases, we execute the similar attack procedure.
We find that the dominant time complexity of all steps in three cases is the data collection. Therefore, the total data, time and memory complexities are 2 122 chosen plaintexts, 2 122 11-round encryptions and 2 102 bytes, respectively.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented new insight on impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round Camellia with the F L/F L −1 and whitening layers. First, we propose impossible differential attacks on reduced-round Camellia for 75% of the keys, which are then extended to attacks that work for the whole key space. As a matter of fact, we attack 10-round Camellia-128, 11-round Camellia-192 and 12-round Camellia-256 which start from the first round and include the whitening layers. Meanwhile, we also attack 12-round Camellia-192 and 14-round Camellia-256 with two F L/F L −1 layers. Second, we construct a set of differentials including at least one 8-round impossible differential of Camellia with two layers F L/F L −1 . This impossible differential has the same length as the best known impossible differential of Camellia without the F L/F L −1 layer.
Therefore, our result shows that the keyed functions cannot thwart impossible differential attack effectively. On the basis of this set of differentials, we propose a new strategy to derive an effective attack on 11-round Camellia-128, 12-round Camellia-192 and 13-round Camellia-256, which do not start the first round but include the whitening and F L/F L −1 layers.
